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 1 
‘The constitution of political membership’: punishment, political membership, 
and the Italian case. 
 
Zelia Gallo 
Dickson Poon School of Law, KCL. 
 
Abstract: The article argues that punishment will vary depending on how political 
membership is constituted in different polities. This has significant implications for 
arguments that link contemporary Western punitiveness to ‘anti-politics’, understood 
here as a degradation of political membership. The article argues that the spread of 
‘anti-politics’ and its penal implications will depend on how political membership is 
constituted in different polities and in their ‘State’. It reaches this conclusion by 
exploring the way in which ‘the State’ appears in the literature on politics and 
punishment, and by adopting a re-worked definition of ‘the State’. The Italian case 
study is then used to demonstrate both the link between punishment and political 
membership, and the need to contextualise our analyses of ‘anti-politics’ and 
punitiveness.  
 
Keywords: state theory, punishment, political membership, anti-politics, Italy 
 
Introduction: political membership and ‘the State’ 
In this article I argue that punishment and political membership are intimately 
connected. This connection emerges from a study of the role that different 
conceptions of ‘the State’ play in analyses of contemporary Western punishment, 
particularly the literature that investigates the link between punishment and politics 
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(Lacey, 2008; Barker, 2009; Miller, 2013; Miller, 2016; Garland, 2001; Loader, 2008; 
Ramsay, 2012).  
To make this argument, I operationalize the key concepts ‘the State’ and 
‘political membership’, and apply them to analyses that have linked punitiveness to 
‘anti-politics’ (Loader, 2008) – a degradation of democratic politics and an expression 
of weakened state sovereignty (Ramsay, 2012). ‘Anti-politics’ is of interest insofar as 
it raises concerns both for democratic politics and for democratic punishment. ‘The 
State’ in such narratives is the Leviathan (Hobbes, 2008), and I argue against such a 
monolithic vision of ‘the State’, by showing that in the politics and punishment 
literature ‘the State’ appears at two additional levels: institutions and citizens. ‘The 
State’ also needs to be understood as relational (Barker, 2009: 31): it is never just the 
personified sovereign, but is simultaneously its institutions, its citizens, and their 
interrelations.  
This reconfiguration of ‘the State’ has implications for the way in which we 
think about punishment: if we expand our notion of ‘the State’, we are automatically 
forced to ask exactly how citizens inhabit their polity, and how this comes to shape 
the demands they do or do not make of the sovereign State, including putative 
demands for law and order. Key to this redefinition of ‘the State’ is the issue of 
political membership, understood as the sovereign State’s conception of its citizens; 
the available routes for citizens to contribute to the running of the State; and citizens’ 
conception of their own belonging. Together these dimensions speak of ‘the 
constitution of political membership’: the manner in which political membership is 
constructed and articulated in any given polity. I apply this notion to claims 
concerning punishment and ‘anti-politics’. I complicate our understanding of political 
membership by asking whether ‘the constitution’, and thus the ‘dereliction’, of 
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political membership have been equivalent across polities. This reveals the limits and 
comparative applicability of the ‘anti-politics of crime’.  
The article’s conceptualisation of ‘the State’ and political membership derives 
from my reading of the Italian case study, a case that challenges contemporary penal 
analyses (Gallo, 2015; Menichelli, 2015). At the penal level, for example, Italy 
displays both punitiveness and moderation (Gallo, 2015: 600-609). Consequently this 
‘dual penality’ is ill suited to accounts that presume either increasing Western 
punitiveness (Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2009) or penal stability (Lacey, 2008).  The 
Italian State also complicates explanations of contemporary punitiveness that call 
upon ‘the State’ as sovereign. The Italian State is ‘contested’ (Gallo, 2015: 610; 
Agnew, 2002: 58) or even ‘absent’ (Cassese, 2011), terms that indicate a historical 
tension between sovereign and citizens, which has an impact on the use and 
distribution of punishment (Gallo, 2015), and is manifest in the existence of informal 
institutions and informal social controls.   
Consequently, Italy is a useful case study against which to test the 
comparative purchase of analyses on political decline and rising punitiveness. The 
comparison with Italy emphasises that penal theories need to take account of 
differences in the construction of political membership across polities, as these 
differences have consequences for punishment. We can neither assume ‘anti-politics’ 
have taken equal hold across Western polities, nor that they inevitably produce a 
demand for more law and more punishment (Loader, 2008: 405).  
The article proceeds in six sections: section one provides a brief explanation 
of the link between punishment and political membership as it features in existing 
literature. Section two analyses ‘anti-politics’ in terms of the decline of political 
membership and its penal implications. Section three unearths the assumptions 
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present in such narratives, both in terms of how ‘the State’ is understood, and in terms 
of the spread of ‘anti-politics’. Section four tests the assumptions on ‘the State’ by 
tracing how the latter appears in the politics and punishment literature; it concludes by 
arguing that we need to look more closely at the constitution of political membership 
across contexts. Sections five and six test this contextual applicability in Italy: first by 
looking at the nature of Italian penality and State (section five) and then by 
interrogating whether Italy can be described as a society dominated by law and order 
(section six).  
 
Punishment and political membership. 
In the literature on politics and punishment, the relationship between punishment and 
political membership has been conceptualised as going in two different, 
interconnected, directions. On the one hand, punishment is a means with which to 
understand political membership: we investigate punishment within particular polities 
to understand how it contributes to, and constructs, membership. Punishment ‘sorts 
and stratifies’ amongst citizens (Barker, 2009: 13; Stumpf, 2006), in the process 
defining the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Lacey, 2008: 6) within our political 
communities: punishment differentiates amongst citizens.  
By analysing punishment we can further identify which transgressions of the 
community’s rules set individuals outside it, and track the effects of penal exclusion 
on offenders’ future reintegration into society (Loader and Sparks, 2014: 117; Stumpf, 
2006: 405-406). Studies that have analysed the evolution of contemporary Western 
punishment during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (for example Garland, 
2001), can thus be interpreted as studies of the instrumental role that punishment 
plays in shaping the relationship between State and citizens.  
Copy accepted for publication 
 
 5 
However, the link between punishment and political membership also goes in 
the opposite direction. The focus here is on political membership, and its construction, 
as an indicator of punishment (Aas, 2014: 526). This point is persuasively made by 
comparative penal analyses, in particular those that have focused on political, 
institutional, and political economic differences across polities (Lacey, 2008; 
Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Barker, 2009: 25), and how they relate to penal 
divergence. This literature is arguing that differently constituted political communities 
punish differently. Institutions, political economy, welfare support, can then be seen 
as mechanisms through which membership is constituted, i.e., mechanisms through 
which the relationship between ‘the State’ and its citizens is constructed, that also 
play out in the penal realm. The article is concerned with this second relationship.  
Throughout the article ‘citizens’ should be understood as legal citizens. Legal 
citizens possess a panoply of rights that are otherwise denied to migrants, or granted 
to them only in dilute forms. This includes voting rights, but also the procedural 
safeguards inherent in criminal law (Zedner, 2013), which may not extend to 
migrants, thus contributing to their differential experience of punishment (Barker, 
2013; Aas, 2014).1  
 
Anti-politics and punishment – problems of membership 
The link between punishment and political membership is directly called into question 
by the ‘anti-politics of crime’, a notion developed by Ian Loader (2008) in his review 
of Jonathan Simon (2007) and Richard Ericson’s work (2007). According to Loader, 
today’s penality – with the predominance of crime and punishment and a harshening 
of penal practices – has been explained as the penality of societies whose political 
reality has changed. In particular, Western democracies have faced a ‘decline of 
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politics’ and a loss of ‘political vision(s)’ (2008: 405) and have consequently lost the 
guiding principles for collective action. ‘Anti-politics’ is associated with Colin 
Crouch’s account of ‘post-democracy’ (2004) wherein citizens have withdrawn from 
political participation, and political activity is relegated to a small group of expert 
professionals (Crouch, 2004; Dzur et al., 2016: 98). The concept of ‘political decline’, 
as linked to ‘anti-politics’ and as it appears in penal literature, presumes the 
fundamental disaggregation of our political communities (Ramsay, 2012: 227; 2016).  
Prey to the structural changes of late modernity (Garland, 2001), subject to the 
hegemony of economy (Ramsay, 2016: 98), and the economic insecurities of 
neoliberalism, bereft of political ideologies with which to interpret present changes 
and future trajectories, political communities lose ‘confident belonging’ (Loader, 
2008: 406). This loss of cohesion is vertical: the weakening of the relationship 
between representatives and represented (Ramsay, 2012: 222; Mair, 2013). It is also 
horizontal: citizens do not trust one another, seeing their fellow citizens as sources of 
risk and potential danger. The axes of political membership have changed: the State 
as sovereign sees its citizens as subjects that need to be constantly controlled and 
constantly reassured (Ramsay, 2012: 229), and where mutual co-existence can only be 
imposed. Citizens perceive the State as culpably absent, precisely where it ought to 
reassure them that they can indeed be ‘confident’ in their mutual co-existence. 
Citizens therefore demand more reassurance, in the form of demands for law and 
order, thus becoming potential sources of ‘punitiveness’. 
Faced with the ‘predicament’ identified by Garland (2001) – an inability to 
control crime and an inability to fully admit to failure  – but faced also with 
‘widespread distrust in government and expertise’ (Loader, 2008: 401) the State and 
its agents offer more penal control. This recipe serves as an attempt at reassertion of 
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authority. It serves also as a diversion ‘to sidestep […] processes of public reflection 
and choice about how to distribute resources and recognition’ (405).  
What the State offers does not address the fundamental structural causes of 
political disaggregation. In fact it reinforces disaggregation where expanding 
criminalisation serves as an authoritative (State) claim to the State’s own lack of 
authority (Ramsay, 2012: 217-219). To the extent that citizens perceive this claim, 
and to the extent that it coincides with the fact or perception of high crime rates 
(Garland, 2001; Miller, 2016), it engenders greater insecurity (Ramsay, 2012: 226).  
Simplifying, the logical progression here appears to be the following: the 
decline of politics leads to, and follows from (Loader, 2008: 404), the centrality of 
crime as a political narrative. Crime becomes pervasive, at least as a source of fear 
(though see Miller, 2016). It stands in for the loss of social cohesion brought about by 
structural changes (‘late modernity’), including economic changes (Wacquant, 2009; 
De Giorgi, 2006), which we can no longer make sense of precisely because our 
political narratives and participatory processes have degraded. The degradation, 
which contributes to a de-legitimation of State authority, is met with an emphasis – by 
State and citizens – on penal control, and punishment as its preferred articulation 
(Loader, 2008: 401, citing Ericson, 2007). The emphasis does not assuage the 
disillusioned citizenry, but in fact reinforces their need for reassurance, leading to 
offers of ‘more police, greater imprisonment, new laws, more criminal offences’ 
(Loader, 2008: 405), in short greater punitiveness. The ‘anti-politics’ of crime thus 
speaks of weakened political membership, as bonds of trust are replaced by fear and 
State coercion, within and across polities.  
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Anti-politics and punishment – assumptions  
This intellectual analysis rests on a number of assumptions. One key assumption 
seems to be about the State’s capacity to monopolise political sovereignty. Past 
though it may be, fleeting as it may have been (Simon, 2007: 13), there was a time 
when the (modern) State was capable of claiming political sovereignty even though 
this may have been no more than a myth (Garland, 2001). More than this, state law 
was the crystallisation of political sovereignty, and frequently commanded legitimacy 
amongst citizens. This is an assumption about the power of the law that is necessary if 
we are to make the logical connection between political disaggregation, and law and 
order. The argument that links the ‘dereliction’ (Ramsay, 2012: 227) of political 
communities to punishment presumes that it makes sense, in the face of insecurity and 
fear, for citizens to turn to the law in a bid for more order. If citizens are ‘eager 
consumers of public and private governmental tools against crime risk’ (Simon, 2007: 
16) the law as integral, though not exclusive (Garland, 2001: chapter 5), part of this 
dynamic must appeal to citizens precisely as such a tool.  
The link between ‘populist punitiveness’ (Bottoms, 1995) – citizens’ clamour 
for more and harsher punishment – and law and order likewise presumes the moral 
authority of state law, a moral authority capable of generating, now that more positive 
avenues for participation and conflict resolution have declined, demands for ‘law-for-
order’ that translate into ‘punitiveness’ and incarceration. Theories of contemporary 
punishment seem to presume that such demands are made by citizens (Enns, 2014: 
869).  Even accounts that are explicitly limited to the assumptions of ‘parliament, 
executive and the courts’ (Ramsay, 2012: 226), beg the question of citizen demands. 
They require us to ask what role citizens play in the process through which state laws 
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produce penal effects: are they making demands for law and order, and how are these 
channelled to produce punishment (Gottschalk, 2013; Lacey and Soskice, 2015: 459)?  
The connection between political decline and punishment also requires us to 
privilege a vision of political membership centred on the vertical relationship between 
State and citizens, in which state law plays a key regulatory role. This is what Insa 
Koch calls a ‘state-centric’ vision of order (2016: 14) where ‘the State’ is to be 
understood as the sovereign. There is space for mediation in such visions, but it tends 
to be (in its ideal form) the mediation of mass political parties, organised around the 
main ideological fault lines of the post-war era. As such, it is mediation that has been 
seriously called into question in Western democracies (Mair, 2013; Crouch, 2004), 
leaving citizens to seek ‘public or private tools’ with which to make up for State 
absence. Without glossing over these problems of democracy, I argue that we may 
nonetheless need to interrogate the limits of these arguments: is ‘the State’ in penal 
theory always and only the sovereign State? Have all contexts equally fallen prey to 
the ‘anti-politics of crime’? 
 
‘The constitution of political membership’ – state levels and conceptions of 
political membership 
In the punishment and politics literature, ‘the State’ in fact appears at a number of 
different ‘levels’. On one level (level 1) ‘the State’ is understood as the sovereign 
authority: Hobbes’ Leviathan (2008), to whom citizens confer centralized authority in 
exchange for the promise of peace and security (Ramsay, 2012: 215; Koch, 2016: 2; 
Loader, 2008: 403). Here we find those theories that have explained contemporary 
punishment in terms of sovereignty and its travails. Garland’s account is a key 
example in this respect (2001), as it discusses modern and late modern penality in 
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terms of the waxing and waning of the ‘myth of state sovereignty’, with the late 
modern State unable to deliver on the modern state’s promise – and hallmark of 
sovereignty – of crime control, and thus forced to rely on increasingly harsh 
punishment to reassert its wavering sovereignty (109-110). 
 The State and its sovereignty are also the subject of Peter Ramsay’s The 
Insecurity State (2012), which analyses contemporary (British) criminal justice 
specifically in terms of state authority, politics and ideology (2012: 230). When 
discussing sovereignty, Ramsay builds on Martin Loughlin’s distinction between 
legal sovereignty and political sovereignty (Loughlin, 2003: 84). Legal sovereignty 
can be understood in terms of competence and authority (85): the State’s absolute 
competence to enact law (84; Ramsay, 2012: 221). Political sovereignty is a matter of 
capacity and power: ‘the capacity of a people to overcome social division and conflict 
by establishing a sense of political unity’, and the power to shape a state and its 
govermental forms (Loughlin, 2003: 85). Political sovereignty is premised on a 
political relationship between citizens and State, more specifically: ‘the reflexive 
relations of accountability between people and government’ (Ramsay, 2012: 221; 
Loughlin, 2003: 85). According to Ramsay it is this political sovereignty that is 
hollowing out, at least in the British context. The ‘hollowing out’ is not merely the 
waning of a myth, but is an actual loss of political sovereignty (Ramsay, 2012: 230), 
brought about by the weakening of the relationship between representatives and 
represented (222). At this level, the State as sovereign also stands in for a – usually 
national – collectivity of which it is the embodiment and impartial representative. 
  Vanessa Barker’s work provides us with an example of the second level (level 
2) at which ‘the State’ appears in penal theory. In her account of penal divergence 
across US federal states, Barker focuses on the institutional framework and decision-
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making processes in each of these regions. This attention to institutions is forefront 
also in Nicola Lacey’s The Prisoners’ Dilemma (2008) and its account of penal 
variation across liberal market economies (LMEs) and co-ordinated market 
economies (CMEs). The LME and CME models (Hall and Soskice, 2001) are indeed 
characterised, not just by different political economic set ups, but also by different 
levels of institutional integration and co-ordination (Lacey, 2008). 
We have moved away here from weakening sovereigns, and moved further 
towards the internal mechanisms of ‘the State’: institutions, decision-making, veto-
points (for Italy see Gallo, 2015). Here ‘the State’ can also be broken down into sub-
national units (such as US federal states:  Barker, 2009; Lacey and Soskice, 2015). 
Broadly speaking, at this level we are addressing the question of the mechanisms for 
different interests to be heard within a given polity, and reflecting on the effect these 
interests do or do not have on policy, including criminal justice policy (Gottschalk, 
2013; Miller, 2008). 
The question of interests and their incorporation, links to the third level (level 
3) at which ‘the State’ is brought into analyses of punishment: as the citizens of the 
State. Within the context of literature concerned with Western penality, reference to 
citizens has often been negative, insofar as citizens are identified as ‘the blood-thirsty 
mob pursing the suspected law-breaker’ (Miller, 2013: 283) whose demands are 
capitalised upon by politicians aiming to ‘shore up the authority and legitimacy of 
government institutions’ (284). This vision of the punitive citizenry links to 
arguments in favour of isolating criminal justice policy from ‘popular passions’ and 
political entrepreneurs (Petitt, 2002; Lacey, 2008), ‘depoliticizing the criminal 
question, to subject crime to a regime of technocratic evaluation’ (Loader and Sparks, 
2016: 318). 
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This vision of the ‘punitive public’, and of the necessity of insulating penality 
from its influence, has recently been challenged (Miller, 2013; 2016; Dzur, 2010; 
though see Enns, 2014; Loader, 2008).2 Lisa L. Miller (2013; 2016), for example, has 
argued that we need to pay closer attention to the ‘complex political demands’ (2013: 
284) that are made by communities beset by high rates of violence, and the conditions 
under which these complex demands translate into requests for more punishment 
(2013; 2016: 198). This means, inter alia, reconsidering the extent to which these 
requests are necessarily visceral and irrational. In the United States demands for more 
law and order might in fact be the only viable, if normatively problematic, way to 
respond to a state absence, the ‘certain level of state incapacity’ (2016: 200) that is 
manifest in exceptionally high rates of violent crime (2016; Gallo, Lacey and Soskice, 
forthcoming). 
To the extent that it rests on the levels of violence in the US, Miller’s account 
is limited to the US. However, from a broader perspective, it highlights the need to 
focus on the dynamic interaction between State and citizens, and its influence on 
punishment levels. Miller’s conclusions also lead us to query some of the assumptions 
made by contemporary theories of punishment, including the assumptions on the 
public as inherently punitive. We find similar reflections for England and Wales in 
the work of Koch (2016). Koch’s ethnographic study of a council estate in England, 
gives us insights into the relationship between the State, state law, and citizens, 
challenging existing accounts of contemporary punishment as the return of a – 
however hobbled – Leviathan (2016: 2). Koch provides a voice to (some of) the 
citizens of ‘the State’ that are implicitly invoked in contemporary penal theories. 
Again, this is a voice that is neither uniformly nor consistently punitive (5). From 
Koch’s account we see how citizens’ relations to the State can vary: thus some of 
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Koch’s respondents appropriate the State and its authority some of the time in 
resolution of personal conflicts (11-12); but at other times they reject the State and its 
authority, and indeed flaunt its laws, particularly where alternative, informal, means 
of social control are available or more accessible (13). 
Though Miller and Koch’s analyses are contextually specific, they ask 
questions with broader analytical validity, which may help us account for penal 
variation across contexts. In particular, Koch asks a key question: ‘in what kinds of 
situations [do] people come to demand more law and order’? (2016: 16; also Barker, 
2007: 628) What ‘alternative demands’ are being made that are not acknowledged in 
penal theory or that have no outlet within given polities? (Miller, 2016: 198; also 
Loader, 2008: 406)  
In sum, where ‘the State’ appears within the literature concerned with 
punishment and politics, it features at one of three levels: the sovereign State; the 
institutions of the State; the citizens of the State. Note that this classification is meant 
to be indicative rather than exhaustive.3 We should also not assume that the three 
‘levels’ are watertight compartments. Contemporary penal theories, even when 
privileging one level explicitly, may in fact be drawing upon aspects of the other two. 
This is most clearly articulated by Barker who, while concerned with the institutional 
mechanisms of the State (2009: 30), is also careful to draw our attention to ‘ordinary 
people, citizens and social groups in civil society’ as the agents of ‘collective action’ 
(30). Barker describes the State ‘as a relationship’ (31), a conception that we find also 
in Ramsay’s work (2012: 222; Loughlin, 2003: 83-86), and echoes of which are 
present in Koch’s ethnography where citizens ‘see the state as a personal tool' (2016: 
3) to appropriate when needed.4  
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To talk of the State as ‘relational’ implies that the phenomenon ‘the State’ is 
not a pre-existing (pre-political) entity, but is constituted by political processes in 
which actors – citizens and political agents – participate and interact. It is also to 
define ‘the State’ in a way that consciously encompasses all three of the levels 
identified above. As we can see from the authors cited, these levels are linked in a 
number of ways. For example: citizens (level 3) are involved in, or excluded from, 
political institutions and decision-making (level 2); institutions and the outcomes of 
decision-making (level 2) simultaneously forge and represent the authority of the 
sovereign State (level 1); the strength of this authority is then what we call into 
question when we discuss sovereignty; and the strength or weakness of state 
sovereignty (level 1) comes to shape the demands made by the sovereign State of its 
citizens, and by citizens of their sovereign State (level 3). I argue that political 
membership is the common denominator across these three levels. Here the term 
‘political membership’ denotes: 
 
a) The State’s conception of its citizens: as sources of authority to be involved in 
decision-making, as risks to be contained, as electors to be assuaged. 
b) The available routes for citizens to contribute to the running of the State, 
interrogating political participation and the accessibility of democratic 
institutions, including relations of accountability between citizens and State.  
c) Citizens’ conception of their own belonging, that is to say, citizens’ 
conceptions of the sovereign State – as a source of authority, as a desired but 
absent authority, as a source of coercion, as a community to identify with – 
but also of themselves and of each other – as trustworthy members of the same 
community, as trustworthy members of a community unified in the State, as 
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sources of risk and fear. Belonging is affected by democratic institutions and 
political cultures  – including available ideological narratives (Loader, 2008; 
Loader and Sparks, 2016) – as they evolve over time.  
 
The three levels of the State, the idea of the State as relational, and a layered 
understanding of political membership, can be summed up in the notion of ‘the 
constitution of political membership’. This expression refers to the dynamic process 
through which the contours of political membership and the State-citizen relationship 
are constructed over time and across different polities. I argue that differences in the 
constitution of political membership will have an impact on the likelihood of ‘anti-
politics’ taking hold within a given polity, and the likelihood of ‘anti-politics’ 
expressing itself as recourse to, and demands for, law and order. Penal theories need 
to allow for contextual differences in the constitution of political membership across 
polities, and therefore allow for contextual differences in its possible degradation and 
attendant penal consequences.  
 
State and punishment in Italy 
Certainly the Italian case allows for no easy assumptions concerning ‘the anti-politics 
of crime’, particularly as a punitive manifestation of sovereign State decline (level 
1).5 It thus serves as an apt illustration of Western penal divergence, and of the need 
to account for such divergence. In terms of punishment, for example, contemporary 
Italian penality has been described as neither punitive nor moderate, but ‘one in which 
repression and leniency co-exist and alternate’ (Gallo, 2015: 599; also Gonnella, 
2013). This oscillation is manifest in Italian incarceration rates, whose ‘background 
increase […] since 1970 […] has [nonetheless] been dotted by repeat amnesties’ 
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(599) and by provisions in favour of decarceration (though of short term effect – 
Gallo, 2015: 606). The same alternation is a broader feature of Italian penal policy 
(602; Padovani, 1981: 93). Italian penality can therefore be characterized as both 
harsh and lenient, and neither an example of straightforward penal convergence 
around a Western ‘punitive’ model, nor an example of straightforward resistance to 
punitiveness.  
 This dual penality is the penality of a ‘contested State’ (Gallo, 2015: 599), and 
it reflects the Italian State’s need to assert its authority on a fragmented reality by 
attempting to monopolise both the distribution of punishment and the dispensation of 
forgiveness. The frequent use of amnesties can partly be seen in this light: as the State 
claiming its monopoly on leniency, either as an act of paternal forgiveness or, often, 
as a pragmatic concession to the needs of a system beset by over-reliance on criminal 
legislation, and by prison overcrowding (Gallo, 2015: 607-608). However, 
moderation in Italy is not just a preserve of the sovereign State. It is also linked to the 
continuing importance of informal social controls (Melossi, 2003: 381) – such as 
those deriving from the family – that may either contribute to reduce deviance, or may 
make state law redundant in the resolution of social conflict. This type of moderation 
has been described as moderation in fact (‘de facto’): not necessarily the outcome of 
conscious policy decisions, but ‘the [formally] unintended corollary of existing socio-
political dynamics’ (Gallo, 2015: 608).  
The Italian State is contested insofar as it has failed to command exclusive 
allegiance from its citizens (Agnew, 2002). This failure derives historically from the 
process through which Italy was unified ‘initially at least, [by initiative of] northern 
Italians’ led by the monarchy of Savoy-Piedmont (Agnew, 2002: 42-43; Cassese, 
2014: 29). Unification was by annexation of Italy’s various regions, rather than by 
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consensus (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007: 3), and this led to a heterogeneous national 
State, that faced substantial internal opposition (27) including, at the time, from the 
Catholic Church (5; Cassese, 2014: 314-315; Donovan, 2003: 97). The national State 
did not come to represent ‘the religious beliefs and practices’ of its citizens, and this 
compromised its ritual and symbolic power (Agnew, 2002: 58; Cassese, 2014: 25). 
This gave the State an ‘extremely fragile social base’ (Cassese, 2014: 38), not least 
because of the initial limitations on suffrage (Cassese, 2011; Cassese, 2014; Urbinati, 
2013: 192). According to Sabino Cassese, the unified Italian State possessed different 
levels of state capacity (‘stateness’ or statalità) and relatively weak institutions: 
Cassese identifies this as a constant feature of Italian history (38). Contemporary 
examples of the ‘contestation’ faced by the State, include both internal political 
terrorism and organised crime, ‘emergencies’ faced by the Italian Republic, that 
represented explicit challenges to its political authority.  
Italy’s internal heterogeneity has then been reinforced by the nation’s 
territorial differentiation (Cassese, 2014: 61), which has been variously 
conceptualised (Sciarrone and Storti, 2015), including by the long-standing division 
between North and South (339). Differentiation persists to this day and is manifest in 
the regional cleavages within the Italian political economy (Crouch, 2005: 5; Trigilia, 
1997), for example in terms of type, size and concentration of enterprises. Regional 
differences provide continuing structural anchorage for Italy’s heterogeneity, as a 
consequence of which the nation displays ‘a tension between centre and periphery’ – 
between central State and its component parts (Gallo, 2015: 610). This tension has 
affected State-citizen relations: ‘for a long period the state has conceived of its 
relationship as mere imposition of sovereignty over its subjects. Meanwhile, civil 
society itself has kept its expectations towards the state and its institutions rather low’ 
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(Selmini, 2005: 317). The centre-periphery tension has also had repercussions on 
contemporary Italian penality, including the negotiation and re-negotiation between 
central State and local authorities on matters of local safety (Selmini, 2005: 311; more 
broadly Cassese, 2014: 34 and 89-114). The central State, for example cut funds 
available to local authorities (Menichelli, 2015: 273), even as a 2001 constitutional 
reform restructured the balance of powers between local authorities and central 
government, ‘listing the duties reserved to national government and those in 
concurrent legislation’ and ‘leaving everything else to the competence of each region’ 
(267). 
To the extent that the Italian State ‘has conceived of the relationship’ with its 
citizens as the necessary ‘imposition of sovereignty’, this has further created the 
potential for a punitive use of the criminal law, precisely as a tool with which to 
impose authority over a heterogeneous polity (Gallo, 2015: 614; Cassese, 2014: 350). 
This is most visible in emergency laws against political terrorism and organised 
crime. These laws, for example, require such offenders to collaborate with the 
authorities, against their terrorist or organised crime group, in order to access 
alternatives to custody (see further Gallo, 2015: 607). Collaboration here serves as 
practical manifestation of renewed allegiance to the State.  
Moderation too is influenced by the tension between centre and periphery, 
insofar as de facto moderation and informal social controls, are linked to the presence 
of so-called ‘intermediate normative orders’: broadly speaking ‘political institutions 
that stand in between the state and its citizens, and mediate between the two’ (Gallo, 
2015: 610). These orders are alternative collectivities which carry with them 
‘intermediate collective loyalties, institutionally subordinate, but psychologically 
alternative, to loyalty for the State’, including ‘party loyalties; but also […] 
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associational, religious and, in various forms, personal’ loyalties (Pizzorno, 1992: 19, 
cited in Gallo, 2015: 611). Examples of such orders include post war mass parties 
(Donovan, 2003: 98) – the Christian Democracy (DC) and the Communist Party (PCI) 
– but also clientelistic and corruption networks, families, and kinship networks. 
Intermediate normative orders are linked to moderation insofar as citizens may 
choose to resolve social conflict by relying on the orders’ norms and practices, rather 
than by relying on state law (Gallo, 2015). Where these norms and practices do not 
coincide with state norms, reliance on them may in fact stimulate the corollary to de 
facto moderation and informal social controls: a low-level, diffuse (‘widespread’) 
illegality (Melossi, 2003: 382; Nelken, 2014: 282), which is thought to characterise 
Italy, and which is manifest in high levels of informal labour and tax evasion 
(Scamuzzi, 1996: 134; Pasquino, 2015; Sciarrone and Storti, 2015; Gallo, 2015: 608). 
For example, estimates for 2014 place the value of the shadow economy at 13% of 
Italian GDP (ISTAT, 2016: 2), with the greatest value added generated by tax 
irregularities, followed by informal labour, and illegal activities.  
Cassese talks of the different ‘layers’ that make up the Italian State that ‘live 
an autonomous life [and] overlap in a non-orderly fashion’ thus producing weak 
legality (2014: 37; or different levels of legality: Sciarrone and Storti, 2015). ‘Weak 
legality’ is not just limited to citizens: widespread illegality also encompasses 
corruption, a phenomenon held to be ‘[embedded] […] in Italy’s institutions’ 
(Rhodes, 2015: 321; Ruggiero, 2010). Political corruption emerged with virulence in 
the 1990s, with the large-scale scandal known as Tangentopoli that contributed to the 
collapse of the erstwhile political parties (Nelken, 1996; Rhodes, 2015). 
Commentators judge that corruption has not abated in Italy since then (Rhodes, 2015: 
320). Moreover, though public opinion has not been consistent in its support for anti-
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corruption (320), Tangentopoli (and the conflict between judicial and political classes 
that it enflamed) has contributed to citizens’ distrust of political and economic elites 
(Vannucci, 2009: 258; Ginsborg, 2013: 284). A 2016 survey reveals, for example, that 
only 6% of those interviewed had ‘much or very much trust’ (‘molta o moltissima’ 
fiducia) in political parties, 11% in Parliament, and 20% in ‘the State’ as a whole 
(Diamanti et al, 2016: 8).  
The depiction of Italy as containing ‘intermediate normative orders’ coincides 
with the idea of normative pluralism, developed by the Italian jurist Santi Romano, 
and held to reflect the ‘[p]luralism […] built into Italian society’ (Zanetti, 2011: para. 
3). Romano argued that the legal order is not the sole preserve of the central State, but 
that a legal order exists ‘wherever there exists a social organism, of some 
complexity’. Such an organism, according to Romano, produces an internal 
discipline, ‘authority, powers, norms and sanctions’ ([1946] 2013: 90). Note the 
similarity here with Della Porta et al’s analysis of recently discovered corruption 
networks (linked to large construction works) in which ‘decisions, attitudes, 
negotiations, expectations […] are based on pre-established scripts following rules 
that are well known to the people involved and informally codified, […][which] 
marginalize or punish those who show opposition or express disagreement’ and 
‘socialize [novices to] the “laws” of corruption’ (2015: 198). 
As this example shows, while a legal order may find support in the State’s 
legal order, it may also be distinct from, or even in explicit contradiction with, state 
law. Examples of the latter include ‘criminal or revolutionary societies’ (Romano, 
[1946] 2013: 33). Again, the Catholic Church, organised crime cartels, but also 
parties such as the PCI, have been identified – despite their notable differences – as 
pertinent examples of alternative normative institutions (Zanetti, 2011). ‘[R]elations 
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such as kinship hierarchies and economic structures’ are then amongst the features 
thought to distinguish these institutions from mere ‘clusters of randomly assembled 
persons’ (Croce and Salvatore, 2007: 8). 
Romano also notes the inverse relationship between the strength of the 
sovereign State and the strength of any internal juridical order contained within it: the 
stronger the State, the weaker the pull of alternative normative authorities and vice 
versa (Romano, [1946] 2013: 88). In this respect Italy seems to have historically 
displayed ‘a […] national state […] rarely able to dominate alternative institutions but 
[…] also in need of some kind of negotiable help from them’ (Zanetti, 2011: para. 
13). That is to say, Italy displays a State beset by a tension between centre and 
periphery (also Sciarrone and Storti, 2015).  
From this depiction, we can conclude that the Italian nation State has 
historically displayed a defect in ‘political sovereignty’ (Loughlin, 2003): it has failed 
to monopolise its citizens’ allegiance, and create a cohesive political unit. In 
contemporary Italy this defect is manifest precisely in the presence of intermediate 
normative orders. This presence alerts us to the fact that political belonging in Italy 
may well be shared belonging. At the citizens’ level, citizens may conceive of 
themselves as belonging simultaneously to a political community unified in the State 
– understood here as an impartial entity representing the national collectivity  – and to 
a political community unified by more personalistic bonds – kinship bonds, for 
example, or the bonds established within a political clientele.  
Citizens may also conceive of themselves as belonging to the State via the 
medium of an intermediate normative order. Thus Italy’s post war mass parties 
educated citizens to political participation in democratic institutions (Selmini, 2005: 
317; Pasquino, 2002: 71; Pasquino, 2015: 38; Urbinati, 2013: 189; Gallo, 2015: 610), 
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with the PCI and DC ‘[adapting] their ideological confrontation so as to make it 
become an […] asset that contributed to the country’s political integration’ (1993: 
558). Here belonging was in the parties – with their historically strong subcultures 
(Donovan, 2003: 98; Bogaards, 2005: 507) – and, through the parties, in the State. A 
similar mechanism follows also from the post-war Italian welfare state, where it 
displays features common to ‘conservative corporatism’ (or 'social corporatism' - 
Urbinati, 2013: 196) which premises incorporation into the nation State on 
incorporation into particular labour categories (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006: 17).  
In sum, in Italy political membership can be in the State and in intermediate 
normative orders; in the State through an intermediate normative order; and in some 
cases in an intermediate order rather than the State (as in the example of organised 
crime or political terrorist associations). Only in some cases is membership 
constituted exclusively in the national collectivity; and only in some cases is the 
primary relationship with political representatives of the national collectivity.  
This shared membership is also possible because of the particular nature of 
Italian institutions, including Republican institutions, described by Cassese as 
‘porous’ to the multiplicity of interests present within the nation (2014: 345; Gallo, 
2015; Rebuffa, 1996; also Bogaards, 2005). The Italian Republic presents both ‘a 
fragmented, corporative, civil society’ and ‘permeable and penetrable institutions’ 
(Pasquino, 2015: 50)6, given their multiplicity of veto-points. Again note that, where 
access to state institutions is by means of an intermediate order, this is likely to 
reinforce intermediate loyalties (Gallo, 2015: 603). Where such orders are premised 
on more ‘personal’ bonds – clientelistic bonds, personal following, kinship – this also 
gives a more ‘privatistic’ nature to the access to democratic institutions (Sciarrone 
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and Storti, 2015). Access here is by political belonging rather than, as with political 
parties, by political participation (Gallo, 2015). 
I have already discussed some of the penal implications of Italy’s shared 
political membership: the sovereign State tries to harness both punishment and 
forgiveness to shore up its authority. We find a push for harsh punishment where the 
sovereign State attempts to contain the risks posed by shared membership. We find 
also a push towards mediation and pragmatic moderation, where the State attempts to 
appropriate leniency, even disobedience, trying to incorporate its recalcitrant citizens 
(and agents) by forgiveness (see also Melossi's notion of 'soft authoritarian 
paternalism', 2001: 412). Shared political membership then creates incentives towards 
de facto moderation if and where state law is displaced by norms internal to the 
various ‘orders’ that co-exist with and within the central State (Gallo, 2015). In sum, 
what we see here is that the constitution of political membership in Italy is 
intrinsically linked to the distribution of both repression and leniency, with shared 
political membership contributing to a dual penality. 
 
Anti-politics and punishment – comparisons and implications 
In his analysis of ‘anti-politics’, Loader urges us to pay close attention to ‘unevenness 
in the development of crime dominated societies’ (2008: 406) rather than presume 
their universality. What does the Italian case contribute to this debate, and with what 
broader implications for theories of State, membership, (anti) politics and 
punishment?  Firstly, given Italy’s ‘contested State’– one in which political 
membership is shared with orders possessing norms that may or may not coincide 
with state law – there is limited space for easy assumptions on state power, or on the 
unchallenged authoritativeness of state law, or on the appeal of state law for citizens. 
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Applying the ‘anti-politics’ premise to Italy, over-estimates past political cohesion in 
‘the State’ as the national collective entity and sovereign (level 1). It also assumes the 
absence of political cohesion today, without investigating the conditions of political 
membership, or querying the capacity for pockets of ‘communal solidarity’ (Ramsay, 
2012: 212) to resist structural changes associated with ‘late modernity’. This vision 
ignores the existence of, and variation in, methods of producing social capital 
(Putnam, 1992; Barker, 2007; Barker, 2009) that do not depend exclusively upon a 
model of politics premised on the mediation of mass political parties. Moreover, to 
assume that political disaggregation leads to a saturation of the political field by forms 
of ‘penal control’ (Garland, 2013), is to presume that the law is capable of 
monopolising citizens’ imagination of, and demands for, order. It is to presume that 
citizens can and do re-imagine themselves as abstracted victims (Simon, 2007; 
Ramsay, 2012) or that they are in fact subject to victimisation, to be solved – in the 
short and long term – only by formal penal censure. 
All such assumptions need to be tested across contexts. For example, if in Italy 
citizens’ political communities are also ‘intermediate normative orders’, then we need 
to ask which of these ‘orders’ has survived into the contemporary era and on what 
terms. It may make sense to talk about ‘anti-politics’ in relation to the passing of the 
PCI and its ideology.7 It may make less sense to apply this analytical lens to 
‘intermediate orders’ unified by family or kinship ties, which may have demonstrated 
greater resilience over time (see Saraceno, 2015).  
Assumptions on politics and punishment also need to be tested against 
comparative institutional differences, insofar as institutions are the means through 
which individuals participate in given polities, giving substance to political 
membership (Barker, 2009). Miller argues that in the US it is significant that the 
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political agenda and policy choices may be closed off to citizens, as this leaves them 
with a choice between ‘maintaining the status quo [– high rates of violent crime –] or 
doubling down on […] support for increasing punitiveness’ (2016: 196; Gottschalk, 
2013). Unsurprisingly citizens may opt for the latter.  
In Italy, the porousness of institutions to a plurality of interest groups is 
similarly significant. Porous institutions have affected the character of political 
participation and in some cases personalised it, for example through kinship or 
clientelistic connections. This consequently begs the question of how ‘representative’ 
representative politics actually were, even prior to their ‘decline’. In a more positive 
light, a porous institutional structure also provides a conduit for different interest 
groups to try and react to, and possibly resist, the structural changes associated with 
‘late modernity’ or economic neoliberalism. Different strata, in a stratified society 
whose political community is only partly unified in ‘the State’, suffer structural 
changes differently.  
Similarly, stratification may also extend to the presence or absence of political 
‘visions’ within society, so that we cannot assume the exclusive dominance of law 
and order narratives. Admittedly contemporary ‘visions’ may be increasingly narrow: 
for example, the demise of mass parties in Italy was met by a resurgence of localism 
(Selmini, 2005: 319; Calise, 1993: 558). Dispiriting as this may be from the 
perspective of a democratic politics premised on inclusive participation and national 
collective goods (Gallo, 2015: 612; Lacey and Soskice, 2015: 469-470), it nonetheless 
suggest that further investigation needs to be undertaken, before we conclude that all 
Western democracies, and all citizens within such democracies, have equally 
transitioned into ‘anti-politics’ with its penchant for penal control. Again, this insight 
is well articulated by comparative penal analyses, where they urge us to focus on 
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‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, their different levels of integration into political 
communities, and their different levels of exposure to penal censure. In Western 
Europe this issue is of particular salience where such ‘outsiders’ are immigrants 
(Lacey, 2008; Melossi, 2013; Aas, 2014; Barker, 2013, 2017).8 
Similarly we cannot presume that, in the face of insecurity, citizens will 
necessarily turn to the law for reassurance. In Italy, the centre-periphery tension 
manifests itself in a dualism between an over-inflation of laws (Gallo, 2015: 612) and 
their circumvention (Cassese, 2014: 342-343); between legal coercion and informal 
mediation. This suggests that, even in the face of the structural changes presumed in 
the penal literature, the demand for ‘law-for-order’ will not be consistent across 
Italian society. Some citizens may turn to the law and legality as the fallback solution 
to the absence of compelling political narratives, and in the presence of political 
corruption. This is indeed the trajectory that Massimo Pavarini traces for the Italian 
Left in the 1990s (1994; Ginsborg, 2013), and is a dynamic that is thought to 
engender a ‘punitive potential’ in Italy (Gallo, 2015: 612; Sciarrone and Storti, 2015). 
However, other citizens may choose to resolve conflicts via the informal norms of 
existing ‘intermediate orders’, suggesting if not outright ‘resistance’ then perhaps 
‘refusal’ of, or ‘indifference’ to (Loader, 2008: 406), the criminal law as a solution to 
social conflict.  
The presence of informal social controls militates against seeing Italy simply 
in terms of a society saturate with penal control. I claim that this issue, the existence 
and persistence of alternative ‘social norms and logics’ (Koch, 2016: 14), is relevant 
also to the penality of other Western polities. David Garland has identified the 
absence of informal social controls, and the deficit in social organisation and social 
integration, as key to explaining the ‘exceptionalism’ of US penality (2013; though 
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see Lacey and Soskice, 2015: 465). In the US, penal control is the necessary ‘back-
up’ where ‘more positive and more productive modes of social control are 
unavailable’ (Garland, 2013: 505; Lacey and Soskice, 2015: 473). This raises the 
question of the fate penal control has had in societies where different forms of social 
control have persisted (Lacey, 2008; Lappi-Seppala, 2008). 
I argue that this question can be re-phrased in terms of the constitution of 
political membership: how is political membership constituted across different 
Western polities? Through what institutional means, permeated by what (changing) 
political narratives, creating what level and manner of identification between the 
State, as sovereign and political collectivity, and citizens? Scholars of punishment 
need to continue interrogating the construction and evolution of political membership, 
and its contextual variation. This process will give us insights into how different 
polities are transitioning into the contemporary era and with what political outcomes: 
to what extent do we face a disaggregation of political communities? These insights 
may in turn help us explain if and why punitiveness, an overwhelming preoccupation 
with crime, and a reliance on penal control, are indeed taking hold in different 
polities: are disaggregated communities turning to state punishment as their solution? 
 
Conclusions: ‘the constitution of political membership’ and penal difference  
Contemporary punishment has been analysed as an articulation of the dissolution of 
political communities. This produces increasing punitiveness, as law and order 
replace more positive civic narratives and processes with which to understand and 
address social conflict. This is the ‘anti-politics of crime’, a development whose 
implications are worrisome insofar as they delineate a deterioration of democratic 
politics, and a deterioration of democratic punishment, two parts of a self-reinforcing 
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cycle of political decline. Political membership is an inherent part of this narrative: 
claims concerning the hollowing out of political sovereignty as a cause of 
punitiveness, are also claims about the changing conditions of political membership 
in Western polities; claims concerning citizens’ demands for punishment, are also 
claims concerning the way in which political membership is experienced, and the role 
that State power plays in this experience. 
 Yet, the ‘anti-politics of crime’ has limits, and this article uses the Italian case 
to reveal them. An analysis of contemporary punishment as the penality of ‘anti-
politics’ rests on some key assumptions. Firstly it requires us to see ‘the State’ 
primarily as the sovereign. Secondly, it requires us to assume the disaggregation of 
political communities in Western democracies. Finally it requires us to assume the 
reliance – by both state agents and by citizens – on law and punishment as a means to 
remedy this disaggregation. I argue that these assumptions need to be explored 
further, and that they need to be contextualised. They are difficult to apply to Italy, 
but research drawn from the UK (Koch, 2016) suggests that the picture may be more 
complicated even within the one European polity thought to fit more squarely within 
narratives of ‘punitiveness’, and ‘anti-politics’. Research from the US likewise 
suggests the specificity of American over-reliance on penal censure and the political 
dynamics (accessibility of institutions; levels of electoral competition) thought to 
accompany it (Garland, 2013; Miller, 2016; Lacey and Soskice, 2015). 
Comparative literature has made this claim before: different polities punish 
differently. In this article I have formulated this claim in terms of political 
membership: differently constituted polities punish differently. They suffer different 
levels of vulnerability to ‘anti-politics’, and if we look beyond the State as sovereign 
to the existence of different ‘orders and logics’, we may find sites of resistance or 
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resilience to political disaggregation. We may also find that, even if faced with 
political disaggregation, not every polity will turn to the law and punishment as its 
preferred solution. Here we have to ask more about State authoritativeness, past and 
present, and the place that the law plays in constituting the relationship between 
citizens and sovereign State. We need to allow for possible ‘indifference’ to formal 
penal censure and preference for informal conflict resolution.  Ultimately, much 
depends on exactly how the relationship between sovereign and citizens is 
constituted, through what historical process and political narratives, captured in what 
institutional structure: much depends, that is, on the ‘constitution of political 
membership’. 
This implies that punishment and political membership need to be studied side 
by side. There are, in this respect, interesting interdisciplinary pathways for us to keep 
following. Scholars of punishment have already been engaging with notions borrowed 
from political sociology, such as ‘post-democracy’ (Crouch, 2004; Loader and 
Sparks, 2016; Ramsay, 2012). Close and critical engagement with this concept, and 
the discipline in which it is rooted, will give us a sharper understanding of how 
punishment changes as politics evolve, and with what level of convergence across 
contexts. At a time when questions of political belonging and political participation 
are thrown into sharp relief by current events and sustained economic crisis, we may 
also benefit from looking at political theory and its explanations of Western polities’ 
democratic difficulties (Loader and Sparks, 2014: 114). Nadia Urbinati (2014), for 
example, has characterised contemporary Western democracy in terms of three 
‘disfigurements’: ‘unpolitical’ democracy, populism and plebiscitarianism. Two of 
these at least – populism and ‘unpolitical’ democracy (or technocracy) – already 
figure in penal literature. These concepts theorise changes in the constitution of 
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political membership: the relationship between State(s) and citizens; the conceptions 
and conditions of political membership; the manifestation of sovereign State 
authority, and its purchase among citizens. They therefore offer fruitful sources of 
analysis for scholars of punishment – also a manifestation of State authority (or lack 
thereof). By paying close attention to how political membership is being reshaped – 
under what conditions and with what contextual variations – we may be able to better 
understand the penal implications of such processes, perhaps forestalling their worst 
articulations. 
 
Notes 
 
1 I do not explicitly deal with such differential experience, though my findings are 
relevant to the current debate on the penalization of migrants. 
2 On public opinion and punitiveness see Roberts et al (2003).  
3 For a more comprehensive account see Barker (2009: chapter 2). 
4 See also Miller’s ‘security gap’ (2013: 3; 2016). 
5 Though ‘the State’ as sovereign occupies a large part of this section discussions of 
sovereignty (level 1) are contextualised by reference to the – formal and informal – 
institutions (level 2) that shape citizens’ belonging (level 3) within the Italian nation. 
6 The ‘First’ Italian Republic (1946-1993) was a ‘partycracy’, characterised by the 
systematic occupation of the state machinery by political parties (Bull and Rhodes, 
2009). Italy still displays institutions porous to political interests (Pasquino, 2015). 
7 The survival of the post-war subcultures ‘well into the 1980s’ (Bogaards, 2005: 507) 
suggests that we may need to interrogate their continuing influence on Italian society. 
8 Ethnicity and race are also relevant to categories of political membership, and thus 
punishment, as the US clearly shows. 
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